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Essays
Did the Slaves Author the
Thirteenth Amendment?
An Essay in Redemptive History
Guyora Binder*
If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offences
which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, hav-
ing continued through its appointed time, he now wills to remove,
and that he gives to both North and South, this terrible war, as the
woe due to those by whom the offence came, shall we discern therein
any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a
Living God always ascribe to him? Fondly do we hope-fervently
do we pray-that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass
away. Yet, if God wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by
the bond-man's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall
be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be
* This essay benefitted from comments by participants at the Yale Legal Theory Workshop, the
Columbia Race and the Law Workshop, the U.C.L.A. Law Faculty Workshop, and the Stanford
Law Faculty Workshop. Particular thanks are owed workshop participants Akhil Amar, Ian Ayres,
Barbara Babcock, Jonathan Bush, David Brion Davis, Eric Foner, Willie Forbath, Barbara Fried,
Tom Grey, Kendall Thomas, Robert Weisberg, and Lucie White. I am also indebted to Robert
Gordon for conveying the comments of students in his "Uses of History" course at Yale, and to
George Kannar, Bill Miller, and Robert Post for their comments.
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paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand
years ago, so still it must be said the judgments of the Lord, are true
and righteous altogether.
Abraham Lincoln1
Lincoln got the praise for freeing us, but did he do it? He give us
freedom without giving us any chance to live to ourselves, and we
still had to depend on the Southern white man for work, food, and
clothing, and he held us, through our necessity and want, in a state
of servitude but little better than slavery.
Thomas Hall'
I. THE PROBLEM: WHO AUTHORED THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT?
No mere appendix to the Constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment
reframed the nation.3 But if the nation emerged from its crucible
founded anew, who were its new founders? I will argue that it makes a
moral difference to whom we credit our "new birth of freedom ' 4 and
that credit is due the slaves.
Recognizing the slaves as framers might change the implications we
find in the Thirteenth Amendment, making it a more potent weapon in
the arsenal of civil rights advocates. But my present purpose is neither to
explicate the values of the slaves, nor to apply those values to Thirteenth
Amendment issues, nor to calculate the benefits to anyone of so applying
them.5 The instrumental value to us of any interpretation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment depends on the prior question of how we define our-
selves and our interests. My present argument goes to this prior question
by urging contemporary Americans to define themselves as political
descendants of the slaves.
As popular memory6 has it, Northern whites gave-and Southern
blacks received-freedom. Treating the Reconstruction Congressmen as
1. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1865, in SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 686-87 (1989).
2. Thomas Hall, Federal Writers' Project Interview, in BEFORE FREEDOM: 48 ORAL HISTORIES
OF NORTH AND SOUTH CAROLINA SLAVES 44 (Belinda Hurmence ed., 1990).
3. See infra text accompanying note 64.
4. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Gettysburg Address, in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, supra
note 1, at 536; GARY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA
(1992).
5. For efforts to explicate the meaning of "freedom" to the slaves, making extensive use of slave
narratives, letters, interviews, and spirituals, see Guyora Binder, Mastery, Slavery and Emancipation,
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1435 (1989); Guyora Binder, On Hegel, On Slavery, But Not On My Head, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 563 (1990); Guyora Binder, Negating Slavery (1992) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the author).
6. There is an extensive literature on popular historical memory. See, e.g., MAURICE
HALBWACHS, THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY (1980); BERNARD LEWIS, HISTORY: REMEMBERED,
RECOVERED, INVENTED (1975); Barry Schwartz, The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study
in Collective Memory, 61 SOCIAL FORCES 374 (1982); DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A
FOREIGN COUNTRY (1985); PAUL CONNERTON, How SOCIETIES REMEMBER (1989); MICHAEL
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founders, constitutional interpreters wonder whether they were more
motivated by the "Negrophobia" of their constituents or "by abolitionist
ideology,",7 or by the desire to leave abolition's "future effect.. . to future
determination."' All three of these accounts recognize only Northern
whites as members of the constituent power whose will was reflected in
the new constitution. In a kind of gift-exchange, Northern whites receive
status as constitutional authors in return for the freedom they supposedly
conferred on Southern blacks.
Yet if black freedom is thus conditioned on recognizing white author-
ity to define that freedom, the gift-exchange is a swindle. As Thomas
Hall complained, whites won "praise" for conferring freedom, even as
they perpetuated "a state of servitude but little better than slavery," slav-
ery under another name. Along with interpretive authority, then, comes
the power to recover the gift and retain moral credit for giving.
How much is such moral credit worth? According to Lincoln, the
man who received most of the credit for emancipation, its worth could be
measured in mountains and oceans. Slavery had left all whites liable for
a mountain of debt "piled by the bond-man's two hundred and fifty years
of unrequited toil," and, "drawn with the lash," an ocean of debt redder
than any ink. For the nation conceived as a New Eden, the sin of slavery
merited a fall, a flood, a curse on its first born sons, a Red Sea engulfing
its mighty hosts. On the redemption of the slaves from bondage, then,
hinged the redemption of the nation's soul.
That white Americans gained so much moral capital from the Thir-
teenth Amendment, while black Americans gained so little material capi-
tal, suggests that there is something deeply wrong with the popular
account of emancipation as a gift from whites to blacks. In this essay I
will argue that this received narrative symbolically dispossesses the
slaves.
Characterizing the slaves' redemption as a gift from whites makes free-
dom a privilege that could be granted or withheld rather than an anterior
right that slavery violated. In this way, popular memory perpetuates and
participates in slavery's original dispossession of the slaves' dominion
over themselves. In thus legitimizing the ex-slaves' prior status, this nar-
rative dispossesses them also of "all the wealth piled by" their "two hun-
dred and fifty years of unrequited toil." In treating freedom as a gift
freely granted rather than a right defended, the dominant narrative also
dispossesses the slaves of their historical agency, and the dignity Ameri-
KAMMEN, MYSTIC CHORDS OF MEMORY (1991); Special Issue on Collective Memory and
Countermemory, 26 REPRESENTATIONS (1989).
7. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 10 (1977) (criticizing JACOBUS TENBROEK,
EQUAL UNDER LAW (1951) (interpreting legislative history of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments as reflecting abolitionist influence)).
8. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 64 (1955).
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can culture has always conferred on the self-reliant. In the language of
property law, denying the adversity of the slaves' self-possession dimin-
ishes their title to themselves. A further consequence of minimizing
slave agency in precipitating emancipation is the exclusion of slaves from
any role in reconstituting the nation. Denied their place among the
framers not only at the original constitutional convention, but again at its
Reconstruction, the slaves remain forever outside the constituent power.
Thus, popular memory dispossesses the slaves not only of their agency,
but also of their authorship of the post-Civil War Constitution.
One implication of effacing slave authorship of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment is the extinction of what we might call the slaves' copyright: their
claims to credit and consequent reward for their creative achievement.
Thus, as argued above, the received narrative wrongly credits others for
the substantial benefits of emancipation to the nation and its white citi-
zens. "In giving freedom to the slave," Lincoln flattered Congress in
1862, "we assure freedom to the free." 9 In denying that the nation
already owed the slaves a mounting debt, and in denying slave agency in
limiting and partially forgiving that debt, popular memory dispossesses
slaves of a claim on the nation's conscience.
A misattribution of the Thirteenth Amendment could deprive the
slaves not only of their copyrights, but of whatever moral rights we think
constitutional authors are owed. Whether constitutional authors should
or even can retain authority over the interpretation of their products
remains controversial. But as long as consultation of "framers' original
intent" remains an important convention in constitutional interpretation,
a misattribution of the Thirteenth Amendment dispossesses the slaves of
their share of influence over the future meaning given emancipation.
In a variety of ways, then, the received account of emancipation per-
petuates the dispossession that was slavery, violating the Thirteenth
Amendment's command that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude
... shall exist." This essay urges interpreters of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to invert the transactional structure of this received account. It
urges interpreters to read the Thirteenth Amendment as the slaves' gift
to the nation, a gift that, like all gifts, cements a relationship and incurs a
debt. If the slaves authored their own emancipation, they must also be
credited with the nation's "new birth of freedom." In this sense, the
slaves were redeemers of a "nation, conceived in liberty' 0O that had sold
itself into moral bondage. As benevolent founders of the new nation
emerging from the Civil War, the slaves have a claim to be recognized as
authors-and authoritative interpreters-of its new Constitution.
Indeed, fulfilling the Thirteenth Amendment's command that slavery be
9. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Annual Message to Congress, December 1, 1862, in SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS 1859-1865, supra note 1, at 413.
10. LINCOLN, supra note 4, at 536.
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abolished entails interpreting that command from the viewpoint of the
slaves.
Such a claim combines two uses of the past we typically see as distinct
and even opposed. When we seek the original intent or understanding of
legal language we treat the past as authoritative. On the other hand,
when we identify past injustice, we seem to challenge the past's author-
ity. There is an apparent tension in an argument that views the abolition
of slavery as enacted law, while condemning the polity that enacted it as
illegitimate because it excluded the slaves.
Yet this tension is apparent only. There is an important continuity
between fidelity to, and revolt against, the past that illuminates how and
why we confer authority upon the past at all. The continuity between
pious and rebellious responses to the past is suggested by the fact that
each implies a duty, alternatively to honor and perpetuate a past, or to
repudiate and disestablish it. In treating a past as a source of either kind
of duty, we accept that past as ours and take some measure of responsi-
bility for it. But proprietorship of the past is a messy business-in claim-
ing a past we inherit a going concern with assets, debts, investments,
reputation, demanding customers, anxious shareholders, and acquisitive
competitors. The duty of fidelity to our chosen ancestors is not neatly
distinguishable from obligations to discharge their debts, correct their
errors, and keep their concern going in a changing world. If we are to
seek justification from the past, it seems, we must be prepared to justify
the past, to fulfill its aspirations, to rectify its wrongs, to redeem it.
But why seek justification from a past so vulnerable to criticism? If the
moral authority of the past depends on our power to judge and redeem, if
as Steven Knapp has argued, "the lines of authority run from present to
past and not the other way, ''I what do we need a past for? Why are we
bound by our horrific past in interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment's
imperative that in the future such horrors "shall [not] exist within the
United States"? Why not simply read our current hopes into the Thir-
teenth Amendment?1 2
The appeal of a prospective interpretation of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment is strengthened by increasingly voiced doubts about the method-
ological possibility of keeping faith with the past. In constitutional
theory, the jurisprudence of original intent has been all but abandoned.
Constitutional scholars assure us that we can never identify authoritative
11. Steven Knapp, Collective Memory and the Actual Past, 26 REPRESENTATIONS 123, 130
(1989).
12. The leading champion of this appealing view that the Constitution should be read as if
written today is Justice Brennan. See William J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER
13-24 (Sanford Levinson and Stephen Mailloux eds., 1988). In a sense, I am not challenging this
conclusion, but adding the qualification that if we wrote the Constitution today we would and should
be mindful of the nation's past.
1993]
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"intenders," or ascribe to them a single determinate preference. We
would not know how to apply such preferences to the present, or
whether doing so would fulfill the interpretive expectations of whomever
held those preferences. 13 In cultural studies, critics of nationalism argue
that nationalist movements invent the traditions to which they would
adhere. 14 If the past we would perpetuate or repair is our own projec-
tion, why not dispense with the pretense and just enforce the normative
conclusions we would have reached anyway? Why not simply enforce
majority will?
One answer is that determining our own preferences, let alone those of
a majority, is no simple matter. We do not arrive at normative judg-
ments in a social and historical vacuum. We derive our values from roles
and identities that are socially conferred. These social identities come
equipped with collectively imagined histories-pasts we are constrained
to accept not because they are "true," but because they are socially avail-
able. Thus normative decision-making involves narratively situating our-
selves in relation to a tradition shared with others. As David Luban
notes, even when we argue consequentially, "the consequences we seek
are in large measure to be sought in the past.... We achieve happiness in
the thought that we have resurrected the memory of our dead ancestors,
rescued their history from the defamations of their enemies, and there-
fore given ourselves a past that makes us comprehensible." 5 Even util-
ity-"happiness"-is a matter of fidelity to the interests our traditions
confer upon us. In this sense, there is no "contemporary" normative
perspective from which to judge tradition-instead, critiques of tradition
must be rooted in a countertradition that stands some chance of muster-
ing support. Traditions are indispensable for constituting politics, and
are no less so for being "invented."
That traditions have no objective foundation or determinate implica-
tions hardly implies that fidelity to tradition is impossible in general. It
is only the pervasive residue of slavery in our traditions that makes
appeals to the past so problematic in the particular context of the Civil
War amendments. But the solution to the deep cleavages of race cannot
be to ignore our painful history and appeal to a contemporary normative
consensus that is nowhere to be found. When a past is so manifestly
unjust and a tradition so exclusive as to preclude their invocation in con-
stitutional decision-making, corrective justice can also be redemptive. By
13. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding
of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
14. See generally NATION AND NARRATION (Homi K. Bhaba ed., 1990); BENEDICT
ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1983); THE INVENTION OF TRADITION (Eric Hobsbawm
ed., 1983); ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983).
15. David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152,
2221-22 (1989) (discussing Walter Benjamin).
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this I mean that rectification serves to make whole not only the victims,
but also the constitutional tradition on which the citizenship of all
depends. The project of redeeming a shared political identity offers all
Americans, privileged as well as oppressed, a common interest in eradi-
cating slavery's continuing legacy-a common interest that a purely pro-
spective jurisprudence cannot provide. Interpreting the Thirteenth
Amendment as if authored by the slaves would be such a redemptive use
of history, enabling us to fashion a common identity out of an unjust
past.
I will acknowledge that such a use of history is not without risks.
What, in the end, can we know of these people? The sleepless souls of
ten generations of slaves we bring back from the dead to adjudicate our
constitutional controversies cannot but be spectral figures, more
imagined than real. Never has any people been more ripped from the
page of history. Nevertheless, I conclude, among the many lessons we
can learn from them is the power of the imagination, against all odds, to
weave together people displaced, orphaned, separated, and abandoned,
into a common narrative of struggle. If they, in their harsh wilderness of
anonymity, could forge a common identity, how much more easily, with
their heroic example to urge us on, can we.
II. THE CLAIM: THE SLAVES AS REDEEMERS OF THE
CONSTITUTION
In this section, I urge that we redeem our fallen past by incorporating
the recorded struggles and aspirations of the slaves into our constitu-
tional canon. My argument is made largely in the form of a story, an
account of the origins of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Narrative argument often bridges the gap between an unjust past and a
proposed future with the rhetoric of Whig history, pregnant with figures
of growth, learning, or progress. Alternatively, the chasm may be more
abruptly leaped with the messianic16 imagery of redeeming or recuper-
ating values that have been alienated or dishonored. The Lincoln of the
debates dangerously interwove Whig and messianic history, implying
that the horror of slavery was adequately compensated by its contribu-
tion to the formation of a union that would foster progress toward free
labor. By his second inaugural, the apocalyptic course of history had
swept him into a messianic narrative as he took the measure of the moun-
tain of moral debt incurred by the sin of slavery, and offered a wistful
prayer for a redeemer's grace.
In turning from Whig history to messianic history, Lincoln acknowl-
edged not just the spatial but also the temporal gash that slavery had
16. See WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS 263-64 (Hannah Arendt ed., 1968) (developing
notion of "messianic time").
1993]
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opened in the union. The nation had forsaken, or been forsaken by, its
ancestry. It had to be redeemed-reborn with a new heritage.17 Against
the background of this imperative to redeem the past, the abolition of
slavery becomes something more than a constitutional amendment-it
becomes fundamentally reconstitutive.
To acknowledge that the reconstitution of the nation depends upon
redeeming the nation's debt to the slaves is already to recompose the
nation, to recognize African-Americans for the first time as parties to its
social contract. But if the interpreter is to regard the resulting contract
as binding on the slaves, she must recognize them not just as beneficiaries
of the contract, but as authors, setting its terms. To redeem the debt
owed the slaves, I am suggesting, this nation must finally come to terms
with the slaves themselves; and to redeem a heritage stained by slavery,
constitutional interpreters must earn the right to claim descent from the
slaves. If we are to give a redemptive meaning to the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, then, we must interpret it in light of the visions of freedom and the
critiques of slavery enunciated by the slaves. 8
A. The Claim Clarified
Before developing this claim, I should clarify its scope in three ways:
First, the argument I offer here is context-specific, as any redemption
narrative must be. It ascribes no blanket privilege to all victims to dic-
tate the terms of corrective justice. 9 Instead, it turns on the agency of
17. See WILLS, supra note 4.
18. How much weight should interpreters of the Thirteenth Amendment accord the discernible
values of antebellum African-Americans, relative to competing constitutive traditions? That will
depend in part on what can be said on behalf of those traditions. I will be arguing in other work that
the various strands of white antislavery thought were too circumscribed by their own racism to earn
much contemporary credit, and that a commitment to racial subordination has continued to shape
our constitutional development since the Civil War. Obviously, the power of slave experience to
redeem our constitutional tradition depends in part on how fallen that tradition would be without it.
Moreover, in weighing slave perspectives against the views of whites, we should take into account
the possibility that enslaved African-Americans had already so adapted to white society that any
further accommodation of the white majority would diminish any distinctively African contribution
to our constitutional heritage to the vanishing point. All such questions of relative weight I leave to
one side. I mean here only to develop the argument that incorporation of slave voices into the
constitutional canon would offer redemption.
19. I offer no brief for redemptive narrative as a "method" or "technique" for objectively
assessing normative claims. Redemption is a motif in much, if not all, narrative; and narrative form
is not a criterion for distinguishing right from wrong normative arguments since it is a characteristic
feature of all normative argument. It is useful to keep in mind the normative ambiguity of the
rhetoric of redemption. Redemption may be either corrective or transactional, depending on
background distributional assumptions. The redemption of a slave, for example, may be seen as the
righting of a wrong, the restoration of an original equilibrium, necessitating compensation from or
punishment of the master. Alternatively, redemption may be seen as an exchange, perpetuating a
current equilibrium. In a variant of this transactional narrative, redemption may be figured as a
benevolent gift or loan to a helpless supplicant, generating a new debt to the redeemer. Much of the
dramatic power of redemption narratives is made possible by their capacity to suspend competing
narrative interpretations. In particular, since any transaction can be recoded as an exchange of gifts,
or as the reciprocal repayment of debts previously incurred, any exchange can be dramatized along
the lines of 0. Henry's Gift of the Magi: as a dispute transcended by mutual sacrifice, mutual
forgiveness, mutual redemption. See David Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L.
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slaves in extracting the promise of emancipation and on the particular
centrality of that promise to the national identity cherished by many
Americans. Still haunted by the restless shade of slavery,
we yearn for the rite that will exorcise this most stubborn of our
attendant demons, our old capricious cruelty now in its third cen-
tury, the crime that bloodies our sacred arrows and puts around us
that odor the Cheyenne smelt around the man who defiled the ulti-
mate covenant by killing a tribal brother as our racism defiles our
covenant with each other and the world.20
Another tedious quarter century has passed since Charles Black wrote
these memorable words, and still slavery remains the breach in our cove-
nant, the nation's original sin. This is what makes the eradication of
slavery's lingering effects more even than a matter of justice: slavery's
victims hold a note, not just for forty acres, but for the nation's soul.
Second, while it seems plausible to anticipate that realizing the slaves'
conception of emancipation would alter the still subordinate status of
African-Americans, it does not follow that it would benefit African-
Americans only. Recent scholarship has offered the Thirteenth Amend-
ment as a potential source of generally available labor rights,2" reproduc-
tive rights,22 and rights to state protection against private violence.23
None of these applications would be foreclosed by the transfer of author-
ity, say, from legislative debates in Congress to slave narratives-indeed I
am confident they would be greatly strengthened.24 Because the slaves
had a rich and distinctive vision of freedom,25 an interpretation of the
Thirteenth Amendment rooted in the values of the slaves could have far-
reaching applications for all Americans.
REV. 251 (1985). Thus, the figure of redemption denotes not so much a single stock narrative as a
generative principle for narrative. In this sense, every effort to identify with a past can be read as a
redemption narrative. See Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon between Legal
Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2240-42 (1989) (describing complex
narratives as assembled out of sequential or nested struggles to restore equilibrium).
20. Charles Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14,
81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967).
21. See Lea Vander Velde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
437 (1989); Lea Vander Velde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men's
Consciences and Women's Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J. 775 (1992).
22. See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 480 (1990).
23. See Akhil R. Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment
Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992); Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor:
Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
207 (1992).
24. For an example of such a use of slave experience, see Amar & Widawsky, supra note 23, at
1370; cf. U.S. v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944-51 (1988) (O'Connor, J.) (narrowing involuntary
servitude to "physical or legal coercion" by viewing these as "necessary incident[s] of pre-civil war
slavery"); but see id. at 965 (Brennan, J., concurring) (reading "slavelike condition of servitude"
more expansively).
25. See generally Binder, Mastery, Slavery and Emancipation, supra note 5; Binder, Negating
Slavery, supra note 5.
1993] 479
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Emancipation forced white Americans to define the "freedom" on
which they had always prided themselves. The obligation to share their
freedom with African-Americans confronted whites with a painful choice
between defining their own freedom narrowly and defining the freedom
of the former slaves broadly. They chose the first alternative, perpetuat-
ing a tradition of identifying freedom as individual independence. This
meant that the newly freed slaves were forced to take their place in soci-
ety as vulnerable individuals, and that the systematic violence and depri-
vation to which they were subject was defined as the product of a series
of individual, discrete, private prejudices. Identifying freedom as inde-
pendence also meant that whites would soon find their freedom vulnera-
ble to an increasingly volatile labor market. Yet participants in Southern
society understood the freedom enjoyed by the masters-and denied the
slaves-to be a matter of social power and community membership. One
of slavery's horrors was the powerlessness of slaves to protect their fami-
lies against separation by sale. From the slaves' viewpoint, not only the
current marginality of African-Americans but the contemporary isola-
tion, commodification, and mutual indifference experienced by many
Americans-their very independence-might look like legacies of
slavery.26
Third, regardless of who would most benefit from a reinterpretation of
the Thirteenth Amendment, my redemptive account of the hearing owed
slave experience is concerned with doing justice to the slaves, not to liv-
ing Americans. As Luban implies, the normative appeal of redemption is
nonconsequentialist: redemptive arguments are premised on the belief
that we can only define fairness and utility for people in the present in
light of traditions that legitimately constitute their rights and interests.
If we assess the values and aspirations of the slaves in terms of their
consequences for any group of contemporary Americans, our judgment
of what is owed those Americans remains uninformed and unauthorized
by the voice of the slaves.
A danger in any consequentialist evaluation of the slave perspective is
that we will see the slaves dimly through the ideological bars erected to
insulate white Americans from responsibility, bars that have come to
encage all Americans in a prison of independence to which the slaves
alone may hold the key. As Alasdair MacIntyre argues, consequential-
ism has an individualist bias, and in the American context individualism
has long had a racial meaning.
From the standpoint of individualism I am what I myself choose to
be. ... Such individualism is expressed by those modern Americans
who deny any responsibility for the effects of slavery upon black
26. See Binder, Mastery, Slavery and Emancipation, supra note 5; Binder, Negating Slavery,
supra note 5.
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Americans, saying "I never owned any slaves." It is more subtly the
standpoint of those other modem Americans who accept a nicely
calculated responsibility for such effects measured precisely by the
benefits they themselves as individuals have indirectly received from
slavery. In both cases, "being an American" is not itself taken to be
part of the moral identity of the individual.27
Hazarding presumptuousness, I would argue that even contemporary
African-Americans would become passive collaborators with slavery if
they calculated their own interests independent of any responsibility to
their enslaved ancestors. Frederick Douglass broke with the Garrisonian
abolitionists over their impulse to avoid responsibility for slavery by
seceding from the South.2" Though formally free, Douglass regarded
himself as still "bound in chains" with those enslaved in the South.2 9 I
do not doubt that many of those slaves' descendants calculate their inter-
ests today as African-Americans similarly, as a question of fidelity rather
than utility.
Because redeeming the past is a precondition to evaluating our current
responsibilities to one another, redemption should not be understood or
defended as a tactic for realizing some other conception of justice.
Accordingly, privileging the "voices" of slaves in constitutional interpre-
tation is neither a substitute for, nor a surreptitious method of, privileg-
ing the "voices" of contemporary African-Americans as such. If aspects
of what the slaves would have recognized as slavery persist in the present
day, contemporary African-Americans may be considered additional
sources of slave experience. However, to the extent that we view contem-
porary African-Americans as interpreters of-rather than participants
in-slave tradition, I think it is wiser to make no a priori ascription of
authority to them. African-Americans may identify with slave tradition
more easily and interpret it more skillfully, but the redemptive power of
slave experience depends upon its availability as part of the heritage of all
Americans.
B. The Claim Developed
Attributing the Thirteenth Amendment to the slaves appropriately
recognizes their privileged access to relevant knowledge, their embodi-
ment of underrecognized and underrepresented cultural values, and their
agency in precipitating constitutional change of benefit to contemporary
interpreters at great risk to themselves.
27. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 205 (1981).
28. See FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 467-80
(Philip Foner ed., 1950); VINCENT HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR
FREEDOM IN AMERICA 137-38 (1983) (flaws of Garrisonian abolitionism); WILLIAM WIECEK, THE
SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 251-52 (1977)
(critique of Garrison offered by Douglass and others).
29. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, My BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM 441-45 (1969) (appendix).
1993]
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
1. Privileged Access to Relevant Knowledge
Slave testimony may be deployed to redeem the inaccuracy of our con-
stitutive myths, on the view that slave status permits privileged access to
normative or descriptive knowledge. This privileged access might result
either from the special cognitive value of slave experience or the special
cognitive costs associated with more privileged vantage points in Ameri-
can history.
The belief that slave status is a special source of normative insight has
a venerable history. In Jewish scripture God's chosen are repeatedly
tested and proven by suffering, and the movement from bondage to
redemption provides the central narrative structure.30 The assumption
that suffering is a source of wisdom or moral privilege is basic to the
Christian reinterpretation of this narrative pattern, and finds expression
in the Hegelian argument that slavery is a path to self-consciousness and
spiritual liberation. 31 In the American context, an African-American
theology of redemption has influenced evangelical religion and thereby
entered mainstream political discourse. And as Lincoln intuited, the
rhetoric of redemption spoke with particular urgency to a nation that, in
the wake of the Civil War, felt as if it had endured its own middle pas-
sage and seen its own bonds of kinship irreparably torn. Constrained to
fashion a spiritual life in the deepest hell of captivity, slaves may be seen
as experts in redemption. As such, their experience may resonate with
all persons struggling to find value in a world of alien traditions.
The claim that slaves have privileged access to descriptive knowledge
relevant to the interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment is rather
more straightforward. To the extent that we prohibit slavery because we
regard it as harmful and oppressive, those people who experienced slav-
ery are likely to be valuable sources of information, bearing witness to its
harmful and oppressive effects.
Rather than privileging a slave perspective, we may be motivated to
subordinate the perspectives on slavery of antebellum whites as tainted
by racial animus or self-interest. Following Hegel's critique of the
master's consciousness as uninformed by direct contact with the world,
we may see the beneficiaries of slavery as systematically self-deceived. In
other writings, I have argued that the paternalistic visions of emancipa-
tion entertained by many white Americans before the Civil War were
complicit in the cultural assumptions of slavery.32 As part of the very
debt in need of redemption, such conceptions of emancipation are
30. The centrality of the motif of enslavement and redemption in the Pentateuch is too self-
evident to require authority. For a discussion of the recurrent theme of proving and purifying
through exile in the wilderness, see DAVID DAMROSCH, THE NARRATIVE COVENANT:
TRANSFORMATIONS OF GENRE IN THE GROWTH OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE 290-97 (1987).
31. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 217-51 (J. Baillie trans., 1967) (1807).
32. See Binder, Negating Slavery, supra note 5.
[Vol. 5: 471
Binder
unworthy of normative or descriptive "credit." By contrast, I have
argued that the conception of freedom Southern whites fashioned for
themselves is worthy of some attention because it was informed by its
contrast with slavery, influenced by the values of the slaves, and under-
written by slave labor. From the perspective of the slaves, "freedom"
may have meant something like the prosperity, power, and status that
masters enjoyed at their expense.13 If we view the slaves as exponents of
Southern culture, the values of the slaves can be privileged as a synthesis
of a characteristically Southern commitment to positive freedom and a
characteristically Northern commitment to equal freedom-a reconcilia-
tion of the sectional crisis far more appealing than the common bond of
racism that reunited Northern and Southern whites at the close of
Reconstruction.
2 Embodiment of Underrecognized and Underrepresented Cultural
Values
A second redemptive function of slave experience is the cultural diver-
sification of our constitutive myths. Thus, we may give new credit to
slave testimony not so much because of its privileged access to descrip-
tive or normative truth, but simply to correct its previous suppression.
African-Americans were, of course, excluded from the political process,
voiceless before the law, and absent from the nation's constitutive myths.
They were denied access to literacy and inscribed with a mythology that
branded them ineducable, acquiescent, cowardly, contented, kinless, and
incapable of making their own history. Slave narratives, generally struc-
tured by courageous struggles to escape and to achieve literacy-and
almost invariably beginning with the heritage claim "I was born"-
therefore served an intrinsically forensic function, apart from their depic-
tion of the cruelties of slavery: they were constructed as refutations of the
justificatory mythology of slavery. And by giving voice to African-
Americans, and inscribing a counter-mythology (albeit one sluiced
through the confining expectations of their white sponsors and audi-
ences), slave narratives served to resist, to correct, to negate slavery.34
We might conclude that unless we recover slave experience and knit it
into the nation's constitutive heritage, we perpetuate an important aspect
of slavery. Thus, if the Thirteenth Amendment is to abolish slavery and
enfranchise African-Americans as citizens, perhaps it entails according
the political vision of the slaves the kind of attention we pay to the views
of the "framers."
33. See Binder, Mastery, Slavery and Emancipation, supra note 5.
34. See James Olney, "I was born'" Slave Narratives, Their Status as Autobiography and as
Literature, in THE SLAVE'S NARRATIVE 148-74 (Charles T. Davis & Henry Louis Gates, Jr. eds.,
1985); Houston Baker, Autobiographical Acts and the Voice of the Southern Slave, in THE SLAVE'S
NARRATIVE, supra, at 242-61.
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3. Recognizing Slave Agency in Precipitating Constitutional Change
Thus, a third rationale for reading slave values into the Constitution
would stress the causal role of slaves in the genesis of the Thirteenth
Amendment in particular. Such an argument pays obeisance to the role
that efficacy inevitably plays in the law's criteria of legitimacy,35 while
challenging the assumptions that slaves were incapable of historical
agency and were too acquiescent to resist slavery. Depicting the slaves as
the collective authors of their own liberation thereby negates the mythol-
ogy of slavery.
At first blush, the slaves' claim to authorship of the Thirteenth
Amendment may seem paradoxical. Few slaves participated in the
Amendment's framing or ratification. Yet the procedural illegitimacy of
the Thirteenth Amendment precludes anyone from claiming formal
responsibility for enacting it. Recall that the Congress that proposed the
Amendment excluded the Southern States, while the Executive and most
of Congress insisted that these states had never left the Union. Such an
exclusion of states is no small matter, given that equal representation of
the states in the Senate was the one remaining feature of the Constitution
that could not be amended pursuant to Article V.36 The Thirteenth
Amendment could not have passed without the support of at least two of
these excluded Southern states, and actually relied on passage by eight.
Not only were these ratifying states excluded from representation during
the Amendment's framing, they were under federal military occupation
at the time of their ratification. Even if they had been free of military
pressure, the Reconstruction governments of these states would not have
represented their citizens, in as much as they were organized with the
consent of just ten percent of the electorate. In any case, Congress condi-
tioned the recognition of these governments on the ratification of state
constitutions abolishing slavery, in probable violation of the amendment
procedures designated by existing constitutions. Confirming the illegiti-
macy of these state governments, the Thirty-ninth Congress still refused
to seat representatives of the Southern states even after they had ratified
the Thirteenth Amendment. 7
Given these serious procedural irregularities, it is fair to say that the
Thirteenth Amendment was not a duly enacted amendment at all. It was
the culmination of a revolutionary struggle; it was the extralegal founda-
35. Examples of the positivist principle that rights depend on their effective defense include the
doctrine of adverse possession in property; the principle of international law that recognition
depends primarily on effective control of territory; and the principle found in any system of
customary law that rights violated with impunity are lost.
36. "[N]o Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and
eight shall in any manner affect them ... [slave trade clause and a related clause preventing inter alia
a head tax on slaves]; and.., no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in
the Senate." U.S. CONST. art. V.
37. See Bruce Ackerman, 2 Discovering the Constitution (1989) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the author).
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tion of a new constitutional order; it was a self-legitimating decree akin
to the Declaration of Independence. Accordingly, identifying the
Amendment's author is a matter of assigning causal responsibility for a
revolution, not of determining competence to enact a law.
Seen in this light, slaves may be said to have "authored" the Thir-
teenth Amendment in at least seven ways.
First, it should be recalled that the language of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment was drawn from the Northwest Ordinance, arguably a crucial part
of the original constitutional compromise on slavery.38 That compro-
mise reflected a short-lived surge of abolitionist sentiment fueled by black
participation in evangelical Christianity and perhaps by black participa-
tion in the revolution as well.
Second, African-American litigants gave meaning to the Northwest
Ordinance and similar language in state constitutions. For example, a
"woman of color" named Mary Clark helped establish the meaning of
free labor by persuading the Indiana Supreme Court that indentured ser-
vitude too closely resembled slavery to be called "voluntary., 39
Third, slaves arguably helped precipitate the Civil War by running
away, even in small numbers. The legislation, litigation, and pam-
phleteering that resulted from Southern anxiety over the Northern
response to runaways contributed to the secession crisis.'
Fourth, runaways and freedpersons played an important role in the
abolitionist movement, especially, as noted above, by communicating
their experiences and thus demonstrating their refusal to acquiesce to
slavery. They not only hastened the crisis by fanning Southern fears of
abolitionism and of free blacks, they helped prepare the Northern public
for an abolitionist resolution.
Fifth, once the war occurred, slaves all but forced the Emancipation
Proclamation by fleeing en masse toward the Union lines. While Lincoln
no doubt perceived the military benefits of African-American allegiance
to the Union cause, he must have been equally impressed with the cost of
siphoning off Union troops to secure the rebels' unruly property. By con-
tinuing to run away after the Proclamation took "effect," slaves gave it
the only enforcement possible."
Sixth, two hundred thousand African-American troops banished the
myth of black cowardice. Along with countless spies, saboteurs, run-
aways, and shirkers, the black regiments did benefit the Union war effort,
making Northern victory more likely. Perhaps even more importantly,
38. See DANIEL FARBER AND SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 147-74 (1990).
39. The Case of Mary Clark, Woman of Color, I Blackf. 122 (Ind. 1821). See ROBERT
STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 144-49 (1991) (discussion of
case). See also Phoebe, a Woman of Color v. Jay, 1 Ill. (Breese) 268 (1828).
40. See JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 167-74 (1990).
41. Id. at 182-93.
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as I note below, by demonstrating their military utility to the American
public, black soldiers provided Lincoln with both a constitutional and a
political justification for the Emancipation Proclamation, which enabled
the Republicans to stay in office and prosecute the war to victory.42 With
the Proclamation in force and the war won, universal manumission, at
least, was a practical fact.
Seventh, once the war was won, the presence of a large number of
blacks under arms continued to exert pressure on federal policy. Black
soldiers were willing to remain mobilized longer than whites and hence
played a greater role in maintaining the military occupation of the South
after the Civil War. By constituting a substantial portion-in many
areas the bulk-of the occupation army, blacks were suddenly in a posi-
tion to influence the terms of the peace. This was a situation that North-
ern and Southern whites alike found acutely uncomfortable, impelling
efforts to speed the demobilization of black troops: "In addition to
charges of incompetence and insubordination, Union generals charged
that black troops were hostile and insulting to Southern whites, threaten-
ing to white women, and encouraged militancy and insolence among
civilian blacks."43 Mary Frances Berry has argued that the quickest way
literally to pacify these armed guardians of black liberty was to constitu-
tionalize emancipation by passing the Thirteenth Amendment."
Given the Thirteenth Amendment's questionable formal pedigree, it
may be said to have been debated and ratified on the battlefields of the
Civil War. Given the agency of the slaves in precipitating, defining, and
resolving that war, the slaves have as good a claim to authorship of the
Thirteenth Amendment as anyone.
The image of an occupying army of slaves laying down their weapons
and disbanding on the promise of emancipation suggests two distinct
contractarian rationales for consulting the expectations of the slaves in
defining emancipation. Such a contract, like The Gift of the Magi, may
be mapped as a double redemption, the simultaneous redemption of the
slaves from bondage and of the nation from its moral debt. In determin-
ing what the slaves could have fairly expected from such a contract, we
may ask how much the slaves gave up and how much the nation
received.
4. Recognizing the Slaves' Sacrifice
Consider first what the slaves gave up in accepting citizenship in a
nation that had authorized and enforced their enslavement. As Southern
42. See JAMES MACPHERSON, BATrLE-CRY OF FREEDOM 686-87 (1989).
43. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 31 (1980).
44. MARY FRANCES BERRY, TOWARD FREEDOM AND CIVIL RIGHTS FOR THE FREEDMEN:
MILITARY POLICY ORIGINS OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1866, at 7-19 (1975).
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judges insisted, slavery presumed that Africans were a "subjugated"
race,45 with "no rights that a white man was bound to respect."'  The
corollary, Judge Edmund Ruffin acknowledged, was that whites had no
rights that Africans were bound to respect:
The end [of slavery] is the profit of the master, his security and the
public safety; the subject, one doomed in his own person, and his
posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the capacity to
make anything his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits.
What moral considerations shall be addressed to such a being, to
convince him what, it is impossible but that the most stupid must
feel and know can never be true-that he is thus to labor upon a
principle of natural duty. . . .Such obedience is the consequence
only of uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing else
which can operate to produce the effect.4"
If, prior to abolition, African-Americans were bound only by force-
rather than duty-to obey American law, the Thirteenth Amendment
can only be construed as an offer of citizenship, imposing no obligation
on the slaves until accepted. Accordingly, the question facing interpret-
ers of the Thirteenth Amendment becomes: what conditions could Afri-
can-Americans, theretofore excluded from the People, have fairly set for
subjecting themselves to American law? Under what conditions and
with what limitations could they accept the legitimacy of a potentially
hostile majority will?
Such a contractarian analysis of the Thirteenth Amendment has some
warrant in constitutional theory of the Civil War era. Treatises on the
Law of Nations read in the nineteenth century, influenced by the con-
tractarian political theories of the previous century, reasoned that
nations owed their citizens an obligation of protection in return for alle-
giance." Abolitionist constitutional theory had given this obligation of
affirmative governmental protection a broad, if somewhat indeterminate,
compass.49 Congressional supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
explained its constitutionality by arguing that the citizenship implicitly
conferred by the Thirteenth Amendment encompassed such a broad
right to protection.5' And in the seldom-cited case upholding the Act's
constitutionality under the Thirteenth Amendment, Justice Swayne
echoed this argument. Swayne added that the amendment must be inter-
45. Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 252 (1859) (Harris, J.).
46. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (Taney, C.J.).
47. State v. Mann, 2 Devereaux Law Rep. 263 (N.C. 1829), in PAUL FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF
FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: A CASEBOOK 218-19 (1986).
48. See, e.g., EMMERICH VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS, Book I, Ch. 2, Sec. 17; Book II, Ch. 6,
Sec. 71 (Joseph Chitty trans., 1834) (1776). See also Luria v. U.S., 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913).
49. See generally JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1962); Robin West, Toward an
Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 111 (1991).
50. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 38, at 302-05 (collecting numerous examples from the
Congressional debates).
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preted on the assumption that its framers "felt that much was due the
African race for the part it had borne during the war." He added that
"they were also impelled by a sense of right and by a strong sense of
justice to an unoffending and long-suffering people," and by the dangers
that people had risked as a result of "evincing entire sympathy with the
Union cause."'" Where Swayne's interpretive approach falls short of
that suggested here is in treating the grant of citizenship as an act of
"grace," 52 rather than the price extracted by the slaves for their alle-
giance in an unworthy nation's struggle for its life. Viewing freedom and
citizenship as the slaves' just price rather than the nation's charitable gift,
an interpreter will more likely consult the expectations of the slaves.
That slave resistance helped precipitate Emancipation may appear to
cut against, rather than for, the authority of slave interpretations of the
Thirteenth Amendment. We have already noted that one strong argu-
ment for including slave values in our constitutive traditions is to correct
their previous exclusion. We may feel that the more influence on history
slaves have had, the less responsibility we now have to conform the out-
come of that history to the subjective desires of the slaves. In contract
law, after all, we assume that, absent severe deficits of bargaining power,
the parties got the agreement that they wanted. But where the contract
is drafted by one party and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the
courts read it against the author.53 Where one party to a contract is
judged to have lacked meaningful choice in making the contract, courts
will replace terms deemed substantively unfair.54
Nevertheless, there are limits to this principle of interpreting or apply-
ing a contract in favor of the more passive party, and we hit those limits
at the point at which one ceases to be a party at all. The conventional
description of the role of the slaves in the Civil War is as passive bystand-
ers, at best third party beneficiaries of the contract between the victorious
Union and the chastened Southern states. Under modern contract law,
such passive beneficiaries have rights, but only to the extent intended by
the active contracting parties.55 So while the slaves' constrained choice
in joining the social contract is one reason to read it in their favor, it is
their agency in joining the contract that establishes their contractual
rights in the first place.56
51. U.S. v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 794 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947); Ransom v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633
(1954) (en banc).
54. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see
U.C.C. § 2-302; see generally ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 31-38 (1987) (exploring various
possible meanings of lacking "choice").
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 302.04 (1981).
56. If the slaves' lack of options in joining the social contract is one reason for supplying fair
terms, the indeterminacy of those terms is another. The laconic text of the Thirteenth
[Vol. 5: 471
Binder
5. Recognizing the Slaves' Contribution to the Nation
The justice of the slaves' expectations turns not only on what they gave
up, but on what the nation gained from the transaction. And here it
seems to me that the nation owed and owes the slaves something more
even than its survival. For to the extent that slaves precipitated their
own emancipation, it was the slaves who gave the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to the nation and to them that the nation owes its own redemption.
Both the appeal and the dangers of figuring the slaves as redeemers are
illustrated by the controversial film Glory which, for all its flaws, exposed
the American public to the bravery of the Civil War's first all-black regi-
ment, successfully struggling for the right to die in combat. 7 After the
massacre of the Massachusetts Fifty-fourth at Fort Wagner in July of
1863, the Atlantic Monthly wrote that "[t]hrough the cannon-smoke of
that dark night, the manhood of the colored race shines for many eyes
that would not see." 8 Lincoln, his unpopular Emancipation Proclama-
tion vindicated, wrote that "when this war is won, there will be some
black men who can remember that with silent tongue, and clenched
teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet, they have helped man-
kind on to this great consummation."59 And many white men had not
forgotten by November, 1863, when the Republicans won stunning victo-
ries at the polls. 6° The Emancipation Proclamation was thus secured.
No doubt the film perpetuated an injustice by focusing on the white
abolitionist who commanded the regiment and recorded the story. As
George Frederickson writes:
Noblesse oblige was the characteristic note struck in New England's
glorification of white 'aristocrats' who officered black regiments ... ,
men like Robert Gould Shaw. Hence it was possible to advocate the
use of Negro troops and glorify their achievements without giving
up the cherished stereotype of black submissiveness and docility in
the presence of "superior" whites.6'
Forewarned, steeled in skepticism, I nevertheless left the theater soaked
in sentiment.
I saw the movie with an attorney who represents battered women in
domestic "controversies." Seeing the unromantic consequences of male
Amendment-proclaiming the abolition of a pervasive and fundamental feature of American society
that implicated and implicates the self-image of almost every American-gives interpreters no
guidance. While contract doctrine directs interpreters to resolve ambiguities by recourse to custom
and usage, it is precisely the scope of abolition's inevitable disentrenchment of tradition that is at
issue. Thus we are driven back to a substantive analysis of the fairness of the bargain, in its historical
context. We may wish to correct, not merely continue, that history.
57. GLORY (Columbia TriStar 1990).
58. Quoted in MACPHERSON, supra note 42, at 686.
59. Quoted in GEORGE FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 168 (1987).
60. MACPHERSON, supra note 42, at 688.
61. FREDERICKSON, supra note 59, at 171.
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violence on a daily basis, she greeted the black soldiers' hunger for battle
somewhat more coolly than I did. Although moved by the portrayals of
the black soldiers, she found it hard to identify with their aspiration to
gain recognition for their manhood by fighting in a white man's war.
Their need to redeem themselves from what Western culture has always
viewed as the slaves' "cowardly contract," by offering themselves up as
cannon fodder, struck her as an index of their continuing lack of free-
dom. She didn't hold them responsible for a culture that associates free-
dom with violence, but she saw their struggle to redeem their freedom on
these terms as more tragic than heroic, more depressing than inspiring.
But to me the story had a different significance, revealing these brave
men as the authors not only of their own freedom, but of all of ours.
Despite the centrality of slavery in the genesis of the Civil War, it was
constitutionally defined as a white man's war-an exercise of power that
could be justified only by pragmatism rather than principle, permitted for
the preservation of a union with slavery, not its abolition. But Northern
whites could not, or at least did not, preserve their union with Southern
whites without the military support of African America. It was the mili-
tary utility of the slaves in a time of national peril that enabled the North
to expropriate the South without violating the constitutional compact
between them.
Thus, the Northern decision to condition abolition on military neces-
sity was aimed at perpetuating the constitutional compromise aptly char-
acterized by William Lloyd Garrison as a "covenant with death" and an
"agreement with hell." 62 It preserved the nation at the peril of its soul, a
peril avoided and a sin purged, as Lincoln intimated at his second inau-
gural, only because the prolonged, fierce, and bloody resistance of the
South necessitated the arming of the slaves. It was for this reason that
Lincoln urged mercy towards the South-no more responsible than the
North for the blot of slavery, no less responsible for its abolition. While
the conditioning of abolition on military need was morally indefensible, it
made it legally and politically possible for the North to dictate the terms
of a new compact with the South, to bind the South legally to freedom.
The nation's constitutional commitment to slavery was a white man's
problem for which African-Americans, of course, bore no responsibility.
But because white America held the keys to their shackles, the contradic-
tions that rent the soul of white America established the historical condi-
tions within which African-Americans were constrained to pursue their
own freedom. By dying in battle, the men of the Massachusetts Fifty-
fourth did far more than show that they were not the "sissies" slaves
were said to be. They demonstrated the military utility of abolition to
62. See PHILIP S. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND
EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 3 (1975) (quoting speech by William Lloyd Garrison as reported
in The Liberator, July 7, 1854).
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the Union cause and thereby-as much as any mortals have-they
turned the tumblers of history and set their people "free." 6 3
As I watched the major motion picture Hollywood had projected onto
these events, I will admit I was moved by more than the sacrifice these
men made for their brothers and sisters still enslaved. It was, to para-
phrase the Passover service, what they "did for me in the land of Egypt"
that brought me out of my seat and raised me up. For, costly as the Civil
War was to this country, no amount of blood spent on a morally indiffer-
ent cause could have redeemed this nation's crime or made it worthy of
our allegiance. I do not know if the intervention of black arms on the
Union side won the Civil War. I do know that they made it a war worth
winning, transforming a jurisdictional dispute into the cause of freedom.
I do not pretend that such men laid down their lives for me, or that my
fine sentiments redeem their deaths. But, because of their sacrifice, I can
view this country as something more than a relationship of convenience,
devoted to whatever selfish interest a majority can temporarily agree
upon. I can pretend instead that by accepting citizenship in this nation
we have committed ourselves to a righteous cause, that we are a commu-
nity dedicated to a proposition as yet unrealized. Describing the day the
Thirteenth Amendment passed the House, one Republican representative
wrote that "[m]embers joined in the [gallery's] shouting and kept it up
for some minutes. Some embraced one another, others wept like chil-
dren. I have felt, ever since the vote, as if I were in a new country."'
And so whether they willed it or no, the glory of the Fifty-fourth was
not theirs alone. By taking up the mud-stained standard of a nation that
did not deserve their sacrifice, they raised it high. As one black soldier
exhorted his fellows,
Our masters, they have lived under the flag, they got their wealth
under it, and everything beautiful for their children. Under it they
have grind us up, and put us in their pocket for money. But the first
minute they think that old flag mean freedom for we colored people,
they pull it right down and run up the rag of their own. But we'll
never desert the old flag, boys, never!65
During the Civil War, Lucy McKim Garrison thrilled to the song of
"thousands of Negroes on the fourth of July last, when they marched in
procession under the Stars and Stripes, cheering them for the first time as
'the flag of our country.' ,'66 And so I thought, filing reverently out past
the popcorn stand, it is only because slaves amended the meaning of the
63. MACPHERSON, supra note 42, at 686-88.
64. Quoted in id. at 840.
65. Quoted in EUGENE GENOVESE, FROM REBELLION TO REVOLUTION 137 (1981) (spelling
converted from dialect).
66. Quoted in id. at 136.
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republic, for which it stands, that I can today cheer it as the flag of my
country.
III. SKEPTICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE PAST
My account of the origins of the Thirteenth Amendment makes for a
nice story. But why should it have any authority in constitutional inter-
pretation? After all, it is largely an account of one man's viewing of a
glitzy Hollywood movie based on a diary recording other men's struggles
in an obscure theater of the Civil War. It seems at once too personal, or
subjective; and too vicarious, too mediated, too inauthentic, to carry
much weight. In this section, I will consider why any account of the past
has normative authority by confronting two forms of skepticism about
the authority of the past: the skeptical critique of original intent in con-
stitutional theory, and the skeptical critique of tradition in cultural stud-
ies. Each of these critiques imposes an impossible burden of proof on
accounts of the past. For constitutional theory, accounts of original
intent must prove objective; for cultural studies, traditions must prove
authentic. While normative argument cannot avoid invoking the past, its
authority does not depend on the objectivity or authenticity of its
accounts of the past. Normative argument seeks to commit listeners to
identify with certain accounts of the past, not to prove their truth.
A. Original History and the Objectivity Problem
Why, in light of constitutional theory's skepticism about original his-
tory, should we care about the reasons for the Thirteenth Amendment's
adoption? Recognizing the good reasons to look back requires forgetting
the bad reasons constitutional theory debunks.
Constitutional theory's skeptical critique of original history is situated
within a larger critique of the courts as institutionally incompetent to
countermand the will of legislative majorities. Constitutional theory
therefore understands history as one of many forms of knowledge courts
claim in their efforts to qualify themselves as technically expert.67
Because the real target of constitutional theory's skeptical critique of his-
tory is the claim of courts to objectivity, that critique says little about the
relevance of history to constitutional decisionmaking as such. Somebody
must make constitutional decisions, subjective and political though those
decisions may be; and they will find it is hard to avoid consulting history
in making constitutional decisions.
Constitutional theory's concern with the relative competence of courts
and legislatures invites dichotomies between legal interpretation and
political will, and between tradition and innovation-yet these dichoto-
67. See Tushnet, supra note 13.
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mies are false.68
Legal interpretation is not an alternative to majority will, but a means
equally indispensable to enforcing majority will or resisting it. Because
majority will is indeterminate at the point of application, no one-no
executive, no citizen, and no court--can enforce it without interpreting
it. More crucially, no one can enforce majority will without interpreting
something prior to majority will: the rule of recognition that constitutes a
sovereign majority. No matter how committed we may be to majority
will in the abstract, we must decide in the concrete whose voices count,
under what conditions, and how they will participate in which decisions.
And we cannot decide such questions by majority will, because there is
no majority will until we decide these questions.
No controversy in our history has so exposed the indeterminacy of
popular sovereignty as the controversy over slavery. To Steven Doug-
las's claim that the legality of slavery should be determined by majority
will, Lincoln responded that "when the white man governs himself that
is self-government; but when he governs himself, and also governs
another man, that is more than self-government-that is despotism."69
Once it is admitted that the question of the power and status of African-
Americans in American society is prior to and partially constitutive of
popular sovereignty, the dependence of political choice on constitutional
choice becomes evident. Whether or not we delegate such constitutional
decisionmaking to courts, we cannot practice majoritarian democracy
without setting and interpreting its ground rules.
The identification of past majority will is subjective, not because the
past is harder to make sense of than the present, but because the identifi-
cation of any majority will depends on the exercise of normative discre-
tion. Certainly we cannot purge current majority will of contingency by
deferring to the will of past decisionmakers. That appeals to the past
cannot free constitutional decisionmaking from politics, however, does
not mean that constitutional decisionmaking can dispense with appeals
to the past.
The invocation of tradition is an almost indispensable component of
68. The dichotomy between legal interpretation and political will is false for reasons beyond
those addressed here. This dichotomy is one variant of the distinction between legal rules and social
interests that enables functionalist legal history. Critical legal scholars have shown how law
constructs the social interests we pursue in our politics. See Guyora Binder, Beyond Criticism, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 888, 895-901 (1988) (critique of instrumentalist jurisprudence); Robert Gordon,
Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 102-09 (1984) (critique of functionalist legal history);
William Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L.
REV. 29 (client interests legally constituted); Ed Baker, The Ideology of Economic Analysis of Law, 5
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1975) (economic preferences dependent upon legally protected property
entitlements); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979) (similar point); Duncan Kennedy, Cost Benefit Analysis of
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981) (similar point).
69. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Reply to Douglas at Peoria, Oct. 16, 1854, in SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 328 (1989).
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political argument and political judgment.7 ° So fundamental is tradition
to our normative deliberation that any effort to free ourselves from one
tradition invokes another.7" Thus while we wield scientific rationality
against received beliefs, Edward Shils points out that "the patterns of
reason and scientific method are not acquired by each possessor who
works them out for himself. They are for the most part transmitted. '72
Similarly, revolutionary movements typically justify the overthrow of
existing order by appeal to still more deeply rooted traditions betrayed.7 a
Rejecting the Burkean opposition between tradition and reason, Alasdair
MacIntyre concludes that "all reasoning takes place within the context of
some traditional mode of thought," while every vital tradition is "consti-
tuted by a continuous argument."74
It might seem that the inherent traditionality of normative argument
could also be deduced from the principle of formal justice that like cases
be treated alike: normative argument typically motivates choice in part
by urging its consistency with some other choice already made in the
narrative, if not the actual past. But likeness between present and past is
only part of the story told by normative argument-unless the listener
can be committed to her past choice, its analogy to a present option may
motivate the rejection of both.
Persuasive interpretations of past choice do motivate future action,
however, because, as cognitive psychologists have demonstrated, people
do tend to feel committed to past choices.75 Moreover, this deference to
past choice is rational: other things equal, consistency with past choice is
a good reason for action. Just as democrats need to identify majority will
before they can attempt to realize it, individual rational utility maximiz-
ers need to identify their own interests before they can pursue them; and
rational utility maximizers often have good reason to make past choices
constitutive of their present interests. The constant reevaluation of
choices is costly, as is the exchange of information with others about
one's intentions. Deference to shared expectations that people will con-
70. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
71. See EDWARD SHILs, TRADITION 21-32 (1981).
72. Id. at 21.
73. That the American Revolution was defended as the preservation of the traditional rights of
Englishmen in the face of the threat of their corruption is now broadly accepted. See BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); Thomas Grey,
Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978). On the traditionality of the French Revolution, see MICHAEL WALZER,
REGICIDE AND REVOLUTION (1974); WILLIAM SEWELL, WORK AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE
(1980); PATRICE HIGGONET, SISTER REPUBLICS (1989); Mona Ozouf, Regeneration, in A CRITICAL
DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 781 (Francis Furet & Mona Ozouf eds., 1989); Keith
Baker, Constitution, in A CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra, at 479.
Modern national liberation movements, like all nationalist movements, advocate the restoration of
indigenous cultural traditions.
74. MACINTYRE, supra note 27, at 206.
75. See LEON FESTINGER, THE THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
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form to customs and persist in habits facilitates cooperation. Commit-
ment to choices therefore reflects a willingness to ascribe to ourselves the
interests or preferences that others ascribe to us. Our past choices signal
our future intentions to others, enabling them to cooperate with us if they
wish.
We can think of tradition as a set of past choices, possibly fictional,
that can be shared by individuals bent on cooperation. In other words,
individuals indifferent as to all goals other than cooperation are well
advised to pursue goals widely perceived as traditional or customary.
Tradition is a cue that, like our habit of bearing to the right of oncoming
pedestrians, coordinates behavior without explicit communication.76 For
action to communicate, it must relate to a narrative context of which the
actor is not the sole author. Viewing all action as communicative,
MacIntyre reasons that "I can only answer the question 'What am I to
do?' if I can answer the prior question 'Of what story or stories do I find
myself a part?' "" If traditionality is the source of action's social mean-
ing, it both requires and enables cooperation.
One of the areas in which cooperation is essential is in the construction
of identity. Personal identity depends upon social recognition. Even
feelings of personal autonomy may depend on competence in socially-
valued tasks, competence that can only be achieved with the sustained
help of others.78 The risk of investing a lifetime in the development of a
self-definition that no one will recognize channels people into the repro-
duction of cultural traditions. The best assurance of an appreciative
audience for one's achievements is to serve values traditionally endorsed
by a particular culture or community. This explains as rational the
seemingly irrational commitment many people show to tradition and
thus explains the power of justificatory appeals to tradition. The claim
that a proposed collective decision is entailed by, or at least compatible
with, the past value choices of a culture provides reassurance that the
decision will sustain cooperation rather than provoke disaffiliation. Par-
76. See DONALD REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND COOPERATION 191 (1980) (drawing on
THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960)); David Gauthier, Coordination, 14
DIALOGUE 195-221 (1975).
77. MACINTYRE, supra note 27, at 201.
78. In an extraordinary reinterpretation of Hegel's dialectic of master and slave, the psychiatrist
Jessica Benjamin has stressed the importance of recognition from several socially recognized others
in the development and sustenance of personal identity. See Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love:
Rational Violence and Erotic Domination, 6 FEMINIST STUDIES 144 (1980). Marxian political
theorist Jon Elster has also argued that recognition is a necessary condition for "self-realization," by
which he means the feeling of autonomous development and self-definition that can arise from
challenging, meaningful work, or participation in political deliberation. Because achievement and
even innovation in any endeavor are culturally defined, argues Elster, self-realization generally
requires training, encouragement, and continuing positive regard from competent others. Because
the requisite competence for realizing oneself and conferring recognition on other self-realizers
requires sustained effort to achieve, self-realization requires sustained cooperation. Jon Elster, Self-
realization and Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Life, 3 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y
97 (1986).
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ticipants in a culture may be willing to accept decisions that otherwise
disadvantage them, or take risks to implement decisions from which they
derive no other benefit, if persuaded that such decisions sustain the cul-
ture that secures their identities. So wagered the author of the Emanci-
pation Proclamation and the Gettysburg Address in implying that
emancipation-however costly-had become necessary to the mainte-
nance of national identity.79
In sum, other things being equal, it is rational for individuals to com-
mit themselves to their own past choices and to defer to shared tradi-
tions; it is rational for individuals to identify themselves with groups and
for groups to defer to past choices. Accordingly, we tend to view tradi-
tionality as a persuasive reason for choice, we expect normative argu-
ment to invoke the past, we ascribe traditionality to choices appealing on
other grounds, and we reinterpret the past to conform to current choice.
By couching normative arguments in traditional terms, we offer our audi-
ence recognition as members of a normative community constituted by a
common past.80 Because we must supply or rely upon such "heritage
tales" in urging any duty upon our interlocutors, we are implicitly inter-
preting history whenever we offer political arguments to one another.8"
Subjective though it may be, political choice requires legal judgment
and historical interpretation. Neither law nor history should therefore be
seen as bulwarks of objectivity, holding in check a sea of subjectivity. It
is the desire to engage in politics, not to flee it, that turns our attention to
law and to history. Through the invocation of shared norms and shared
traditions, we hope to persuade our fellow citizens, rather than simply
coerce, outvote, or outspend them. Constitutional theory's skeptical cri-
tique of original history-provoked by the claims of courts to objectiv-
79. Understanding the cooperative nature of important value choices deepens our earlier
intuition that the reevaluation of past choice is costly. Individual choice is more than the
implementation of a presocial preference for a particular good: it is the choice-sometimes the mere
acceptance-of a social role that in turn dictates preferences. Outside of any social identity there are
no criteria by which to make individual choices, because there is no self. See MACINTYRE, supra
note 27, at 204-05. In this sense, choice is often better described as judgment than as preference,
because it involves the interpretation of preexisting obligations implicit in the chooser's identity. For
a description of political choice as the exercise of judgment rather than will, see Arthur Jacobson,
The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the Common Law, 29 BUFF. L.
REV. 599 (1980). Conceived as judgment, individual choice has an inherently narrative structure,
basing any instrumental choice on previous constitutive choices. See Mark Kelman, Choice and
Utility, 1979 Wisc. L. REV. 769, 787; Richard Pildes & Elizabeth Anderson, Slinging Arrows at
Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2121, 2194-95 (1990). We can, and do, revise these constitutive choices. See Kelman, supra, at 787.
But to reevaluate all of one's past decisions at once is to be without criteria for evaluating any. In
this sense, unrestricted choice is more than costly: it is self-defeating. See Pildes & Anderson, supra,
at 2193-94. To the extent that personal identity depends on group identity, group choice is similarly
restricted-the instrumental rationality of social choice depends on sustaining the traditions that
constitute the group and that, by means of cooperation, secure to its members durable identities.
80. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 293-94 (1990).
81. For an illustration of this point, see CELESTE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC:
COMMUNICATING SOCIAL CHANGE (1990).
[Vol. 5: 471
Binder
ity-presumes a more exacting standard of justification than is warranted
for political argument.
Thus far I have shown that there are better reasons for constitutional
interpreters to look back than the ones that constitutional theory attacks.
Constitutional decisionmaking is inherent in political decisionmaking
and constitutional argument must engage the past not to avoid politics,
but to join it. Yet, the fact that the "countermajoritarian difficulty" is a
false problem for constitutional interpretation (as opposed to judicial
authority) does not mean that constitutional interpretation poses no real
problems. Just as there are better reasons for constitutional interpreters
to invoke the past than the quixotic aspiration to objectivity, there is a
better objection to the past's authority than its indeterminacy. The diffi-
culty with invoking the past in American constitutional decisionmaking
is that our particular past is horrific. America's history is what divides
us as a nation, not what joins us together.
Impelled by a seemingly relentless drive toward philosophical abstrac-
tion, contemporary constitutional theory moves from particular contro-
versies to the indeterminacy of constitutional language and history, to
the inscrutability of language itself.82 This penchant for waxing "philo-
sophical" subjects constitutional theory to the ridicule of pragmatists
who point out that far from providing an obstacle to interpretation, lan-
guage is its enabling condition. 3 Interpretation is a conventional prac-
tice with conventional criteria of success and failure; we can never refute
a particular interpretation by arguing that interpretation is universally
incapable of meeting any criteria of success. The indeterminacy of lan-
guage and the subjectivity of history are "difficulties" with no particular
political implications, 4 difficulties that constitutional theory need not
endeavor to solve.
Seeing politics as inherently "difficult" for law to assimilate, constitu-
tional theory has ignored the particular difficulty within our politics
posed by the absorption of slaves into the polity that enslaved them. By
denying that the past could ever speak persuasively to the present, consti-
tutional theory has succeeded in maintaining a discreet silence about the
particularly sordid "original history" that makes our society's race rela-
tions record so singularly lacking in moral authority.
Thus, constitutional theory mischaracterizes as epistemological a
82. The origin of this philosophical trend in constitutional theory was the extraordinary impact
of Ronald Dworkin's Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975). Among the best articles locating
the sources of interpretive indeterminacy outside of any historical context are Sanford Levinson,
Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982); Gary Pellet, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
83. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT CoMEs NATURALLY (1990); Dennis Patterson, Law's
Pragmatism: Law as Practice and Narrative, 76 VA. L. REv. 937 (1990).
84. See Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78
CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1466-67 (1990).
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problem that is actually political; it mischaracterizes as universal a prob-
lem that is quite historically specific. Crises over the legitimacy of judi-
cial review, like controversies about original history, do not spring up all
over the Constitution's text. Instead, they obsessively revisit the scene of
our greatest crime, returning so often to the Civil War amendments that
they have worn a rut into which all constitutional theorizing seems to
flow.85 It is the indeterminacy of these constitutional texts in particular
that has inspired the most despairing pronouncements on the impossibil-
ity of interpretation. 6 Thus the reason that the Civil War amendments
have occasioned so much historiographic controversy is not that it is
somehow theoretically impossible to maintain faith with the past. The
real problem is that tradition cannot tell us how to negate a past that
does not deserve our faith.
It is their implicit rejection of some of the most fundamental traditions
of antebellum society that make the Civil War amendments so peculiarly
indeterminate. It is the persistence into the present of some of the consti-
tutive values of slave society that makes judicial enforcement of the Civil
War amendments politically risky. And so it is this enduringly
countercultural character of the Civil War amendments that occasions so
much concern about the judiciary's countermajoritarian character.
In sum, the skeptical critique of original history is one expression of
the continuing controversy over the legitimacy of any form of judicial
interpretation of the Civil War amendments. The real problem, however,
lies not in the judiciary but in the Civil War amendments themselves.
Absent some unifying narrative context in which to interpret the Consti-
tution, it remains, even after its reconstruction, a house divided by his-
tory. Far from demonstrating the irrelevance of history to contemporary
normative disputes, the continuing inscrutability of the Civil War
amendments testifies to the dependence of deliberative politics on a com-
85. Since World War II, historiographical controversies over the Civil War amendments have
recurred with what Avi Soifer called "Locust"-like regularity. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947); Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160 (1976); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Aviam Soifer, Protecting
Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651 (1979). See George
Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1346-49 (1990)
(constitutional theory underestimates the merits of textual formalism because it ignores such areas as
criminal procedure); Stephen Carter, Constitutional Interpretation and the Indeterminate Text: A
Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821 (1985) (pointing out interpretability
of most of the Constitution); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985) (same
point).
86. I think it is fair to say that the Fourteenth Amendment is the context for the anguished and
qualified conclusions of such liberal constitutional theorists as Ely and Perry that "interpretivism" is
unworkable, and for the arguments of such critical legal scholars as Brest and Tushnet that their
qualifications are insupportable. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980);
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Brest, supra
note 13; Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).
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mon past. Seen in its proper context then, the skeptical critique of origi-
nal history reveals the urgency of redemptive history.
B. Tradition and the Paradox of Authenticity
If Glory illustrates the debt contemporary Americans owe the slaves as
constitutional redeemers, it also illustrates the moral risks of thus condi-
tioning the black voice in America's constitutive mythology on its power
to redeem a mostly white citizenry. My self-mocking account of viewing
the film is meant to convey something more than the ironic distance with
which participants in postmodern culture are obliged to excuse, if not
quite disguise, their own sentimentality. Surely there is something
unconvincing in the identification of late-twentieth-century white audi-
ences with the violence of black Civil War soldiers, safely channeled by
white officers, or with the hopes and rages of slaves, neatly ordered by
their white editors and amanuenses. Redemption seems too cheaply
purchased at the price of a movie ticket, and identification across so great
a distance in time, social status, and cultural perspective almost certainly
requires flattening the multidimensional reality of the slaves. To my
mind, however, these are risks-not refutations-confronting any consti-
tutive use of history in normative argument. Awareness of these risks
should inform, but need not invalidate, what I regard as an inevitable
feature of constitutional interpretation.
Consider the danger that identification with slave founders will enable
whites to purchase a clear conscience cheaply, at little gain to contempo-
rary African-Americans. After all, generations of African-Americans
have watched whites expropriate their cultural products and eschew their
society. At the same time, they have had to watch whites enjoying
ecstatic communion with fictional representations of blacks. From the
days of the Great Awakening, when the presence of slaves served as a
catalyst for the ritual release of emotion by white worshipers, through
the slavery controversy, when affectionate "Sambos" vied with long-suf-
fering "Uncle Toms" for the sympathies of the reading public, white
Americans ascribed "redeeming virtues""7 to their subject people.
The literary appreciation of these virtues may have afforded white
readers a vicarious redemption, but it actually did little to redeem the
slaves. As Henry Louis Gates sardonically notes,
as late as 1829... George Moses Horton's master at North Carolina
collected his slave's poems, published them as a book, and then
falsely advertised in Northern black and antislavery newspapers that
all proceeds from the book's sales would be used to purchase Hor-
87. FREDERICKSON, supra note 59, at 101.
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ton's freedom!"8
As if anxious to avoid a similar swindle, Thomas Hall told his interview-
ers from the federal writers' project:
You are going around to get a story of slavery conditions and the
persecution of Negroes before the Civil War, and the economic con-
ditions concerning them since that war. You should have known
before this late date all about that. Are you going to help us? No!
You are only helping yourself. You say that my story may be put
into a book.... Well, the Negro will not get anything out of it....
Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote Uncle Tom's Cabin. I didn't like her
book, and I hate her. No matter where you are from, I don't want
you to write my story... 89
Hall implied that a nation built on slavery could not buy redemption
merely by selling a stamp commemorating the cultural contributions of
African-Americans, when what was needed was a deed to forty acres of
ground.
Against the background of this tradition of cultural expropriation we
might well wonder how subversive "multiculturalism" can be today, now
that cultural diversity has become a consumer commodity, a little cilan-
tro spicing the cuisine of the gentry, advertising their third-worldliness.
Just when the culture of the oppressed is accepted into the canon it
ceases to be the exclusive possession of the oppressed. 90 But if we cannot
assume that predominantly white interpreters of America's slave heritage
will interpret it against their own interests, neither can we treat those
interests as independent of the process of interpretation, or assume that
whites will be unambiguously benefitted by the subordination of blacks in
all possible worlds.
It goes without saying that interpreters will only incorporate slaves
into their heritage tales if they perceive that to be in their self-interest.
But what they define as their self-interest depends on how they narra-
tively constitute themselves. In maintaining the political and economic
subordination of blacks in the wake of "abolition," whites have consti-
tuted themselves as independent free laborers; and so constituted, whites
may have an interest in maintaining that subordination. But by recog-
nizing slaves as their political ancestors, whites have the opportunity to
88. HENRY Louis GATES, JR., FIGURES IN BLACK: WORDS, SIGNS, AND THE "RACIAL" SELF
13 (1987).
89. Hall, supra note 2, at 45.
90. "[S]cholarly accentuations of group identity may be heard as suggestions that faculty
candidates of color ought to be judged. .. by conformity to a cultural mode that someone constructs
as, say, black .... [A]ny such constructions will come from the minds of (predominantly white)
people in 'predominantly white'.. . social settings .... It seems that inviting us to say who is and
who is not culturally 'of color,' as we go about (re)populating our institutions, should not routinely
be considered a sure and safe path toward desubordination." Margaret Jane Radin & Frank
Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1052
(1991).
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inherit a richer freedom and so to reconstitute themselves as participants
in a community of recognition. After abolition, whites can no longer
monopolize the "power in fellowship" separately sought by antebellum
Southerners, white and black;9' and, because power and status in a com-
munity are inevitably underwritten by access to material resources, shar-
ing power and status is never costless. But whites may rationally
conclude that inheriting a richer freedom and a richer civic identity from
slave ancestors is well worth the distributive costs of sharing that free-
dom and that identity with African-Americans. Doing so would involve
learning what David Brion Davis regards as Hegel's most important les-
son: that "true emancipation, whether physical or spiritual, must always
depend on those who have endured or overcome some form of slavery." 92
Nevertheless, the worry that whites bent on redemption will invent
compliant and forgiving slave ancestors points to a deeper difficulty
inherent in mobilizing tradition for normative argument: the likelihood
that tradition will rely on distorted images of the past.
As I have suggested, argument from tradition persuades by facilitating
cooperation; that is, by offering to connect its listeners to others via a
shared identity rooted in fidelity to an authoritative past. Arguments
from tradition, in other words, identify us with others both synchroni-
cally and diachronically. In thus connecting us to others, arguments
from tradition must confront a problem that post-structuralists see as
inherent in group identity: the paradox of authenticity. 9a This paradox
derives from the assumption that to be authoritative, tradition must
"authentically" represent past.actors. But when we turn to the past for
normative guidance about what to do, we inevitably construct a fictional-
ized representation devoid of ambivalence and contradiction. The para-
dox of authenticity implies that all modern exponents of slave experience
who view it as a source of normative authority are likely to falsify the
experience to which they would be true.
To be sure, interpreters of the Thirteenth Amendment cannot simply
identify and apply the "authentic" values of the slaves, for reasons simi-
lar to those that complicate the jurisprudence of original intent.
First, those values did not remain static. They evolved over ten genera-
tions, and within each generation from the dependence of childhood
through the soaring individuality of adolescence and the responsibility of
adulthood, to the preoccupations with memory, mortality, and creature
comfort characteristic of age. Of those ten generations, eight were rein-
forced by a gradually diminishing influx from Africa. Those born in
91. See BERTRAM WYATIT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR 331 (1982).
92. DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-
1823, at 565 (1975).
93. For explanation and critique of this motif in post-structuralist thought, see Guyora Binder,
Representing Nazism, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1367-83 (1989); Guyora Binder, What's Left?, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1985, 2035-40 (1991).
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Africa could long for return to a remembered homeland; those born in
America were expatriates without origin, aliens in a society partially of
their own making, but not at all of their choosing. In the creation and
reproduction of slave culture, no generation can be privileged; we can
identify no origin or consummation that will define slave culture.
Instead, slave acculturation was an unfolding historical process of the
Americanization of Africans and the Africanization of America. In
some respects, Africans became even more African in America, in the
sense that the culture they developed was Pan-African rather than local
and tribal. Like peasants of all cultures, they developed a national iden-
tity only on being uprooted,94 while the particular experience of enslave-
ment encouraged African-Americans to connect national identity with
freedom, a normative synthesis that would have had no meaning in
Africa. In short, the construction of African identity in America was
conditioned on its "adulteration" by an American context that the slaves
resisted, accommodated, and also shaped.
Second, slave culture was not only dynamic but also polyvocal. Like
any collective author of legislation, slaves invested a variety of hopes in
emancipation. In other writings, I have argued that African-American
tradition generally favored collective over individual freedom, and mate-
rial over formal freedom, and that in many contexts community and
material welfare were mutually dependent.95 Even if my claims are per-
suasive, however, the pursuit of community and of material welfare may
have had divergent implications in many settings. Thus, it might be that
a majority of the slave population was committed to each of these values
at a given time, but a minority was committed to both.
Third, exponents of slave tradition must apply it today in a different
society, with different valences of power, to problems then unforeseen.
This involves coming to terms with an even more complex historical pro-
cess which consisted of both the continued constitutional development of
the nation, and the continued suppression, assimilation, reconstruction,
and dissemination of African-American culture.96 As to the continuing
constitutional development of America, I will argue in future works that
it has been largely along lines compatible with the constitutive commit-
ments of slave society.97
94. See GELLNER, supra note 14; ANDERSON, supra note 14; Dov RONEN, THE QUEST FOR
SELF-DETERMINATION (1979).
95. See Binder, Mastery, Slavery and Emancipation, supra note 5; Binder, On Hegel On Slavery,
But Not On My Head!, supra note 5; Binder, Negating Slavery, supra note 5.
96. For lucid and urgent exposition of the dynamics of this process and the political choices with
which it confronts African-Americans, see CORNEL WEST, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE: AN AFRO-
AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CHRISTIANITY (1982).
97. The post-Reconstruction doctrinal history of the Thirteenth Amendment involved the
progressive closing off of the doctrinal avenues suggested in U.S. v. Rhodes, supra note 51, and in
Harlan's dissents in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883), Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
552 (1896), and U.S. v. Hodges, 203 U.S. 1, 20 (1905), avenues that could have been reopened by the
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Thus, while our temporal distance from the ratification of the Thir-
teenth Amendment makes the task of applying slave experience more
complex, the subsequent failure to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment
fully means that our task may not be fundamentally different from the
task facing the nation in 1866. The experience of African-Americans
prior to 1866 can help us distinguish slavery from freedom, and so can
help us identify the persistence of slavery after passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment. This will enable us to see some subsequent African-Ameri-
can experience as additional evidence of slave values. Kendall Thomas
has argued, for example, that modem civil disobedience by African-
Americans is the expression of a continuing refusal to accept the legiti-
macy of American law.98 If so, citizens bent on redeeming America may
have to come to terms not only with generations of the dead, but with
living African-Americans as well; and the distance between 1866 and the
present is just one leg of the larger distance between 1619 and the pres-
ent, and between precolonial Africa and contemporary America.
The dynamism, pluralism, and temporal remoteness of slave experi-
ence suggest that phrases like "the authentic values of the slaves" simply
have no referent. Certainly, to the extent that "authentic" values are
only those derived entirely from within a tradition, with no trace of
external influence, no value can be authentic to a tradition. But if no
normative argument can accurately represent a set of values as authentic
to a particular tradition, there is something wrong with the criterion of
authenticity, rather than the normative arguments it is used to judge.
Just as the skeptical critique of originalism presumes originalism's
address to the impossible task of expelling politics from adjudication, the
paradox of authenticity depends upon mischaracterizing tradition as a
purely descriptive concept. Yet the accuracy of any description of the
past depends on the purposes for which we describe it. Commenting on
one Native American community's quest for recognition as a tribe,
despite its members' partly coerced assimilation into American society,
James Clifford writes that "interpreting the direction or meaning of the
historical 'record' always depends on present possibilities. When the
future is open, so is the past. In a present context of serious revival,
[tribal traditions and institutions merely] went underground [during the
nineteenth century]." However, in a present context of assimilation,
Clifford concludes, tribal traditions long ago "disappeared." 9 9 Being true
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racist restraints on the New Deal Congress's constitutional vision, see Marc Linder, Farm Workers
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to the past in the context of constitutive argument is a matter of fidelity,
not accuracy: we choose a past to be true to. In constructing traditions,
we cannot emulate those archaeologists so committed to preserving an
unadulterated record of the past that they hesitate to break ground.
But if we are free to invent the past of our choice, what prevents our
fellow citizens from choosing badly, even embracing the legacy of
slavery?
Only our persuasive efforts. Collectively we can indeed choose
whatever identities we wish-but we cannot choose our identities indi-
vidually. Because identities are social choices that cannot be altered uni-
laterally, they situate and constrain our moral judgments. Thus, we
embrace those views that are permitted by identities we wish to claim;
and we interpret those identities in ways that encourage the present and
future adherence of others. My argument-like all normative argu-
ment-is directed at those who have already restricted their choice of
identities to a narrow range of options.
I am addressing only those who feel some attachment to an American
identity, involving fidelity to a Constitution that-about as explicitly as
possible-rules out embrace of our slaveholding past and includes former
slaves and their descendants as citizens. The voluntary nature of identifi-
cation with tradition is crucial to my argument, however, because it
means that no one can compel the acquiescence of the slaves and their
descendants in this identity-aspirants to American identity must win
adherence from the living and deserve it from the dead. No one can
retain an American identity of the sort described without the cooperation
of the slaves and their descendants. Hence claimants to such an Ameri-
can identity have a stake in fashioning a version of it that the slaves could
have accepted without humiliation and that, to the extent slavery and its
effects persist, contemporary African-Americans will accept.
What we want to know about the slaves-what forms of freedom and
citizenship they would have accepted and would now endorse-we can-
not know. These questions are frankly hypothetical. What we want
from the slaves-consent to our plans, identification with our redemptive
aspirations-we can never finally get. "Many thousands" have gone and
left us abandoned, orphaned, bereft. The daunting responsibility all of us
face in interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment is therefore to act and
speak for the slaves, to resurrect them in our imaginations, to invent
them anew for their own purposes, not only ours. Can our imaginations
do them justice? Yes, perhaps, with their help.
Natally alienated, radically displaced, repeatedly separated by sale or
seizure for debt, African-American slaves may have been more acutely
conscious than any people in human history that tradition is a fragile
work of the imagination. From diverse cultural threads they were able
to weave a resilient web of narrative tradition that connected them, one
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to another, across the generations and across the sea-a web of fiction as
important to their survival as the fictive kinship with which they reknit
networks of affiliation routinely torn by sale. Drawing on African
accounts of slavery as social death and ancestral abandonment; drawing
on West African initiation rites depicting a death, followed by "seekin' in
the wilderness"'" and ultimate rebirth; drawing on the Exodus narra-
tive, on Christ's Passion and Resurrection, and on the familiar rigors of
escape, the slaves wove a mythic account of their ordeal in slavery as a
collective sojourn in the wilderness, harsh and endless as death itself, but
in which they could nevertheless retain, reproduce, and bequeath to
those who would claim it the faith that they would one day reemerge
alive, reborn, redeemed.
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COMMUNITY-CULTURE AMONG THE GULLAHS 58, 285-95, 309 (1988).
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